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LAWYERS GONE WILD:                                                                                      
ARE DEPOSITIONS STILL A “CIVIL” PROCEDURE? 
ERIC B. MILLER 
Depositions are an extremely effective and widely used discovery 
device.  Unfortunately, attorneys and litigants seeking to frustrate their 
opponents often abuse the deposition process by using obstructionist, or 
“Rambo,” tactics.  This Note examines different types of deposition 
misconduct and the different approaches courts have used to remedy these 
problems.  This Note then looks at deposition misconduct in Connecticut 
and the sanctioning power of its state courts.  Finally, this Note sets forth 
several suggestions on how to better curb deposition misconduct, including 
more frequent judicial intervention, greater use of video depositions to 
provide better evidence of misconduct, and wider observance of the 
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LAWYERS GONE WILD:                                                                                      
ARE DEPOSITIONS STILL A “CIVIL” PROCEDURE?  
ERIC B. MILLER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Depositions are one of the most effective discovery tools in a lawyer’s 
arsenal.  They are a way to gather information that has not been filtered by 
opposing counsel, they allow lawyers to evaluate deponents as witnesses, 
and they allow immediate follow-up on unexpected, spontaneous answers.1  
Depositions can also expose weaknesses in an opponent’s case and lead to 
discovering faults in one’s own.  Statements made during depositions can 
be used for impeachment and for refreshing a witness’s recollection in the 
courtroom.  Depositions are also a way to preserve witnesses’ testimony in 
case they cannot testify at trial.  If one’s ultimate goal is settlement, 
depositions that show weaknesses in an opponent’s case can provide 
considerable settlement leverage.  One court has rightly recognized the 
importance of depositions as “the factual battleground where the vast 
majority of litigation actually takes place.”2 
The deposition process is, however, subject to abuse by attorneys and 
by litigants who seek to obstruct it.  Vulgar and abusive language, witness 
coaching, “speaking” objections and improper instructions not to answer, 
and even physical violence have been known to occur, thus calling into 
question the usefulness of depositions as a discovery device.  These 
problems arise from the reality that depositions are rarely supervised and 
largely unregulated.3  Different jurisdictions have implemented rules and 
codes to avoid these practices,4 but inside the deposition room, with no 
judge present, lawyers sometimes perceive unfettered opportunities to 
inquire or interfere with the inquiry, which too often leads to offensive 
                                                                                                                          
* Clark University, B.A. 2006; Clark University, M.A.T. 2007; University of Connecticut School 
of Law, J.D. 2010.  I would like to thank Mark Dubois for his comments and guidance throughout this 
process.  This Note is dedicated to my parents for their endless support and encouragement.  All errors 
contained herein are mine and mine alone. 
1 A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, 57 MD. L. REV. 273, 278 (1998). 
2 Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
3 See Interim Report of the Comm. on Civility of the Seventh Fed. Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 
371, 388 (1991); James G. Carr & Craig T. Smith, Depositions and the Court, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 635, 
636 (1997); Dickerson, supra note 1, at 278; Alyson Nelson, Deposition Conduct: Texas’s New 
Discovery Rules End Up Taking Another Jab at the Rambos of Litigation, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1471, 
1474 (1999); Christopher J. Piazzola, Ethical Versus Procedural Approaches to Civility: Why Ethics 
2000 Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1197, 1215 (2003). 
4 See infra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
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behavior.  At the same time, courts do not address deposition misconduct 
with great regularity and often fail to sanction such misbehavior. 
Several scholarly articles have suggested ways to remedy this 
misconduct, ranging from encouraging lawyers to study and practice the 
teachings of Jesus Christ,5 to simply telling lawyers to “shut up and knock 
it off.”6  This Note argues that courts should intervene with more frequency 
to establish clear expectations of proper behavior and to punish abuses of 
the deposition process.  This Note proposes several methods for doing so. 
Part II of this Note examines different kinds of misconduct that occur 
at depositions.  Part III analyzes the different sanctions courts have 
traditionally used to address these types of behaviors and the sources of 
judicial authority for such actions.  The approaches used by courts are 
usually either monetary or non-monetary in nature.  After looking at what 
punishments courts have implemented, Part IV discusses Connecticut’s 
approach to disruptive deposition tactics, with a look at sanctioning power 
and the recent Connecticut Superior Court decision in Faile v. Zarich,7 and 
the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Ramin v. Ramin.8  Part V 
concludes with suggestions for curbing abusive deposition practices, 
including more frequent judicial intervention, referrals to professional 
disciplinary boards, wider acceptance of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers Code of Pretrial Conduct, and more frequent videotaping of 
depositions to act as a deterrent to and provide stronger evidence of 
misconduct. 
II.  THE LAWYER DID WHAT? 
It is worth noting a reality in researching deposition misconduct; 
sanctions for such misbehavior are not pursued in court with great 
regularity and it is difficult to get a good sense of what is happening at 
depositions if problems are not reported.9  A 1989 study of the Central 
District of Los Angeles County Superior Court found that motions seeking 
sanctions for deposition misconduct constituted only 15.9% of all sampled 
motions for pre-trial sanctions and 16.6% of all motions for discovery 
                                                                                                                          
5 L. Timothy Perrin, Lawyer as Peacemaker: A Christian Response to Rambo Litigation, 32 PEPP. 
L. REV. 519, 534–35 (2005). 
6 Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 
1619 (1996).  
7 No. HHDX04CV5015994S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1779 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2008). 
8 915 A.2d 790 (Conn. 2007). 
9 See Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“Currently at bar is an issue 
on which, despite its presence in nearly every case brought under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
there is not a lot of caselaw: the conduct of lawyers at depositions.”); Carr & Smith, supra note 3, at 
635 (“Though reported instances are rare, anecdotal indications suggest that abuse by inquiring counsel 
is recurrent, especially in metropolitan areas . . . .” (citing Marvin E. Aspen, The Search For Renewed 
Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 513 (1994))). 
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sanctions.10  Surveys of attorneys in the Seventh Circuit, conducted by the 
Committee on Civility of the Seventh Circuit in the early 1990s, 
demonstrated that deposition abuse is commonplace.11  The examples that 
follow are therefore limited to reported and unreported decisions and 
scholarly articles, and undoubtedly do not accurately reflect the full extent 
of deposition misconduct around the country. 
A.  Vulgar & Abusive Language 
One type of deposition misconduct is an attorney’s use of vulgar or 
abusive language.  In Saldana v. Kmart Corp., the plaintiff’s attorney, Lee 
Rohn, said “fuck” four times and was generally hostile and abusive to 
opposing counsel during pre-trial discovery.12  On two occasions, during 
depositions, Rohn said:  “Todd, I don’t want to fuck around,” and “I will 
put my remarks on the record as I’m entitled.  I don’t need to be lectured 
by you, sir.  Don’t fuck with me.”13  After a jury verdict in her client’s 
favor, Attorney Rohn—perhaps to rub it in—sent a letter to the defendant’s 
expert witness which stated: 
Since you threw down the gauntlet, I thought you would be 
interested in knowing what the jury decided.  The jury 
awarded Ms. Bell $475,000.  They discounted your 
testimony completely and felt you were pompous and 
arrogant.  I did concur with one of the jurors who referred to 
you as a Nazi.14 
It is not surprising that these actions were brought to the court’s attention.  
No review of deposition misconduct would be complete without 
reference to the infamous Joe Jamail of the Texas Bar.  In Paramount 
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court 
raised, sua sponte, the issue of Attorney Jamail’s conduct at a deposition in 
a Delaware action that was taken in Texas, stating that they were forced “to 
add this Addendum. . . . One particular instance of misconduct during a 
deposition in this case demonstrates such an astonishing lack of 
professionalism and civility that it is worthy of special note here as a 
                                                                                                                          
10 Florrie Young Roberts, Pre-Trial Sanctions: An Empirical Study, 23 PAC. L.J. 1, 57 & n.101 
(2001).  This study sampled a two month period in the Central District of Los Angeles County Superior 
Court.  It determined that out of 813 motions for pre-trial sanctions during that period, 516 were 
“studiable.”  A motion was “studiable” if it included points and authorities, declaration of the facts, 
amount of sanction requested, and an actual ruling by a judge.  Id. at 3–4, 15 & n.32. 
11 See Interim Report of the Comm. on Civility of the Seventh Fed. Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 
371, 388 (1991) (noting that surveyed attorneys frequently encountered hostility, witness coaching, 
improper instructions not to answer, and other abusive conduct during depositions). 
12 Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 629, 637–38 (D.V.I. 1999), rev’d in part, 260 F.3d. 228 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
13 Id. at 637 (emphasis omitted). 
14 Id. at 638. 
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lesson . . . of conduct not to be tolerated or repeated.”15  The Court recited 
a few choice excerpts to illustrate Mr. Jamail’s tactics: 
MR. JAMAIL:  He’s not going to answer that.  Certify it.  
I’m going to shut it down if you don’t go to your next 
question. 
MR. JOHNSTON:  No.  Joe, Joe— 
MR. JAMAIL:  Don’t “Joe” me, asshole.  You can ask some 
questions, but get off of that.  I’m tired of you.  You could 
gag a maggot off a meat wagon.  Now, we’ve helped you 
every way we can. 
MR. JOHNSTON:  Let’s just take it easy. 
MR. JAMAIL:  No, we’re not going to take it easy.  Get done 
with this. 
. . . . 
MR. JOHNSTON:  Are you finished? 
MR. JAMAIL:  I may be and you may be.  Now, you want to 
sit here and talk to me, fine.  This deposition is going to be 
over with.  You don’t know what you’re doing.  Obviously 
someone wrote out a long outline of stuff for you to ask.  
You have no concept of what you’re doing. 
Now, I’ve tolerated you for three hours.  If you’ve got 
another question, get on with it.  This is going to stop one 
hour from now, period.  Go.16 
The court noted that, “[a]lthough busy and overburdened, Delaware trial 
courts are ‘but a phone call away’ and would be responsive to the plight of 
a party and its counsel bearing the brunt of such misconduct.”17  
Attorneys can also be sanctioned for not acting to stop their witnesses 
from using profanity during depositions.  In GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., a 
breach of contract case, Aaron Wider, the owner of HTFC, was deposed in 
what the court called a “spectacular failure of the deposition process.”18  
The deposition took two days, and the court found that “Wider used the 
word ‘fuck’ and variants thereof no less than 73 times,” compared with the 
word ‘contract’ which was used only fourteen times.19  Perhaps more 
                                                                                                                          
15 Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 52 (Del. 1994). 
16 Id. at 53–54. 
17 Id. at 55 (quoting Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993)). 
18 GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 184 (E.D. Pa. 2008).  
19 Id. at 187. 
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noteworthy in the eyes of the judge was Wider’s attorney’s failure to stop 
the offensive language during the deposition.20 
Courts have also issued orders when an attorney has made derogatory 
remarks to another attorney based on gender or marital status.21  In 
Laddcap Value Partners, LP v. Lowenstein Sandler P.C., defense counsel 
took a three-day deposition of the plaintiff’s representative.22  Thomas 
Decea, attorney for the plaintiff, “repeatedly directed the witness not to 
answer certain questions posed to him, which were, on many occasions, 
followed by inappropriate, insulting, and derogatory remarks against 
[Attorney Michelle] Rice concerning her gender, marital status, and 
competence,” including asking Attorney Rice several times whether she 
was married.23  A few examples include: 
MR. DECEA:  This is not a white collar interview that you’re 
sitting here interviewing something with your cute little thing 
going on.  
MS. RICE:  My cute little thing?  
MR. DECEA:  This is a deposition that has rules about what 
kinds of questions you can ask and how to ask them.  You’ve 
led him the entire morning.  You  led him all day Monday 
when there’s no reason to lead him.  If you want to lead him 
to get into a subject area I can understand that and I’ll let that 
go, but when you get to the subject area ask him nonleading 
questions.  
MS. RICE:  Mr. Decea, you conduct the type of deposition 
you wish to conduct, I conduct the type of deposition I wish 
to conduct.  
MR. DECEA:  And I respect that.  I’m just saying respect my 
defense, respect my defense of the litigation, that’s all.  
Nothing personal, dear.  
MS. RICE:  Nothing personal, dear, let’s see.  I can’t tell you 
the number of things that you have said were more than 
personal and certainly offensive and probably— 
 . . . . 
                                                                                                                          
20 See id. at 196 (noting that Attorney Ziccardi’s conduct during the deposition was undertaken in 
bad faith and his failure to intervene was willful). 
21 See, e.g., Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (finding 
unprofessional conduct warranting sanctions where a male attorney stated to a female attorney: “I don’t 
have to talk to you, little lady”; “[t]ell that little mouse over there to pipe down”; “[w]hat do you know, 
young girl”; “[b]e quiet, little girl”; and “[g]o away, little girl”). 
22 Laddcap Value Partners, LP v. Lowenstein Sandler P.C., No. 600973-2007, 2007 WL 4901555, 
at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 2007). 
23 Id. 
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MS. RICE:  It doesn’t matter. 
MR. DECEA:  It does, hon.  
 . . . . 
MR. DECEA:  You better get somebody else here to try this 
case, otherwise you’re gonna be one sorry girl. 
MS. RICE:  A sorry girl?  
MR. DECEA:  Yes.24 
Surprisingly, Attorney Decea claimed—to no avail—that he was “not 
aware of any rule or law which require[d] civility between counsel.”25 
B.  Witness Coaching 
Another tactic used by attorneys inside the deposition room is witness 
coaching through suggestive or “speaking” objections.  Ordinarily, 
objections to the form of the question should be made succinctly—to be 
preserved for trial—and then the witness may answer.26  It is improper to 
have extended speaking objections suggesting an answer to a pending 
question.  As the court in Hall v. Clifton Precision noted, “once a 
deposition begins, the right to counsel is somewhat tempered by the 
underlying goal of our discovery rules: getting to the truth. . . . Once a 
witness has been prepared . . . that witness is on his or her own.”27  When 
attorneys begin to suggest answers for their witnesses, depositions stray 
from their truth-seeking function. 
New York’s rule governing objections at depositions reads:  “Every 
objection raised during a deposition shall be stated succinctly and framed 
so as not to suggest an answer to the deponent . . . . [D]uring the course of 
the examination persons in attendance shall not make statements or 
comments that interfere with the questioning.”28  Simmons v. Minerley 
involved extensive witness coaching at a deposition.29  At his client’s 
deposition, plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Genna, made numerous suggestive 
objections and gave instructions not to answer, including this exchange 
highlighted by the court: 
The plaintiff was then asked by defendants’ counsel: 
“In that Notice of Claim, did you allege that there was an 
                                                                                                                          
24 Id. at *3–4. 
25 Id. at *1. 
26 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2) (“An objection must be stated concisely in a non-argumentative 
and nonsuggestive manner.” (emphasis added)). 
27 Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
28 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 221.1(b) (2010). 
29 Simmons v. Minerley, No. 5554/06, 2007 WL 2409595, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 24, 2007). 
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obstructed view of the intersection?  Yes or no?” 
At that point, Mr. Genna stated: 
“I will not allow him to answer that because what’s in the 
Notice—there’s no testimony that he’s read it and knows 
what’s in it, so there’s no foundation for that question.  What 
the document says and what he knows it says may be two 
different things.” 
Mr. O’Connor stated: 
“I know that.  We’re not supposed to say any of this.  We can 
do it outside of the presence of the witness.”30 
The court held that Attorney Genna’s objection to lack of foundation was 
improper under the New York rules—he should have objected and then let 
the deponent answer the question.31 
In R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., the 
court noted that the attorneys on both sides were at fault for “depositions 
[that] have been contaminated from start to finish with interrupted 
questions, ad hominem comments, and argumentative colloquy, sometimes 
running on for pages.”32  As this Note later examines, the court came up 
with a creative penalty for the attorneys.33  Courts are clearly becoming 
more and more “intolerant of ‘“speaking” objections to questions [that 
have] the barely concealed purpose of communicating to the witness how 
[he or] she should answer.’”34 
C.  Improper Objections & Instructions Not To Answer 
In most jurisdictions, attorneys at depositions may only object and 
instruct a deponent not to answer a question in order to preserve a privilege 
or to enforce a limitation from an order of the court.35  If the questioning is 
being conducted in bad faith or so as to annoy or embarrass the deponent, 
some jurisdictions will allow objections and instructions not to answer so 
that the deponent’s attorney can seek the assistance of the court, often via a 
                                                                                                                          
30 Id. at *6 (emphasis added). 
31 Id. 
32 R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 102 F.R.D. 39, 40 (D. Md. 1983). 
33 See infra Part III.A. 
34 Victoria E. Brieant, Techniques and Potential Conflicts in the Handling of Depositions, Course 
No. SN040 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 583, 596 (2007) (quoting Heller v. Wofsey, Certilman, Haft, Lebow & Balin, 
No. 86 Civ. 9867, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7765, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1989)). 
35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2) (“A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when 
necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion 
under Rule 30(d)(3).”); CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 13-30(b), in OFFICIAL 2010 CONNECTICUT 
PRACTICE BOOK 85, 200 (2010) [hereinafter CONN. PRACTICE BOOK], available at http://www.jud.ct. 
gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PB_2010.pdf (containing almost identical language to the Federal 
Rules); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 221.2 (2010) (same). 
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motion for a protective order.36  In Riddell Sports Inc. v. Brooks, the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York found that 
instructions not to answer that do not fall within these categories are 
generally inappropriate.37  Likewise, the District Court of Maryland has 
held that instructions not to answer, which do not conform to the Federal 
Rules, are “presumptively improper.”38   
What objections are permitted at depositions?  Relevance objections, 
for example, are usually not necessary and are improper.39   Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), objections to the form of the 
question are proper if the question is: 
1.  Leading or suggestive;  
2.  Ambiguous or uncertain; 
3.  Compound; 
4.  Assum[ing] facts not in evidence; 
5.  Call[ing] for a narration; 
6.  Call[ing] for speculation or conjecture; or 
7.  Argumentative.40 
In Connecticut, certain objections are waived unless made during the 
deposition.  This rule establishing waiver is embodied in Connecticut 
Practice Book section 13-31(c)(3)(B), which states: 
Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in 
the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the 
questions or answers . . . and errors of any kind which might 
be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly presented, are 
waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the 
taking of the deposition.41  
In Lowell v. Shustock, the court noted that this rule “exists because of a 
recognition that many of the objections made at a deposition are entirely 
                                                                                                                          
36 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3)(A) (“At any time during a deposition, the deponent or a party may 
move to terminate or limit it on the ground that it is being conducted in bad faith or in a manner that 
unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or party.”); CONN. SUPERIOR COURT 
RULES § 13-30(c), in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 35, at 200 (using language tracking the 
Federal Rule); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 221.2 (2008) (containing similar language as 
the Federal Rule, but adding: “A deponent shall answer all questions at a deposition, except . . . (c) 
when the question is plainly improper and would, if answered, cause significant prejudice to any 
person.”). 
37 Riddell Sports Inc. v. Brooks, 158 F.R.D. 555, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
38 Boyd v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys., 173 F.R.D. 143, 147 (D. Md. 1997). 
39 See In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614, 618 (D. Nev. 1998). 
40 Id. at 618. 
41 CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 13-31(c)(3)(B), in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 35, at 
202. 
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capable of being fixed on the spot, and that doing so at the deposition stage 
helps trials go more smoothly.”42  Judge Miller ordered that the contested 
deposition continue, and that “[c]ounsel who want to preserve objections 
for trial will . . . be expected to state the ground for any form objection 
they choose to make when this deposition resumes.”43 
The FRCP contain an identical rule regarding waiver of objections if 
not made at depositions.44  In Oberlin v. Marlin American Corp., the 
Seventh Circuit held that defense counsel’s failure to object to the form of 
certain leading questions at the deposition resulted in a waiver of his right 
to object to their introduction at trial.45  Similarly, in Elyria-Lorain 
Broadcasting Co. v. Lorain Journal Co., a witness’s deposition was 
introduced at trial.46  When the deposition was offered, the opposing 
attorney tried to object to some of the deposition questions as leading.  The 
Sixth Circuit held that the attorney had waived his objection by not making 
it at the deposition.47 
D.  Physical Violence 
There have been rare instances where attorneys at depositions have 
engaged in physical altercations.  In Connecticut in 2004, Attorney James 
Brewer took a videotaped deposition of Lt. Jack Casey of the West 
Hartford Police in a case concerning the suicide of a police officer.48  
Brewer began asking questions that defense Attorney O’Brien would not 
permit the deponent to answer.49  Eventually, O’Brien declared the 
deposition to be adjourned, at which point Brewer physically attacked 
O’Brien and Casey.50  Both O’Brien and Casey filed grievances and 
Brewer was charged with several felonies and misdemeanors.51  
Ultimately, Brewer was convicted only of misdemeanor breach of peace.52  
Brewer withdrew from practice after the deposition and received a ninety-
day suspension.53  In June 2005, Brewer was disbarred by Judge Holzberg 
for failing to comply with certain court orders regarding medical 
                                                                                                                          
42 Lowell v. Shustock, No. CV075008834S, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2759, at *6 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 19, 2007). 
43 Id. 
44 See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(d)(3)(B) (“An objection to an error or irregularity at an oral examination 
is waived if: (i) it relates to . . . the form of a question or answer . . . or other matters that might have 
been corrected at that time; and (ii) it is not timely made during the deposition.”). 
45 Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1328–29 (7th Cir. 1979). 
46 Elyria-Lorain Broad. Co. v. Lorain Journal Co., 298 F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1961). 
47 Id. 
48 Brewer v. Town of W. Hartford, No. 3:05cv849, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72734, at *2 (D. Conn. 
Sept. 28, 2007). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at *2–3. 
51 Id. at *3. 
52 Id. at *4. 
53 Id. at *3. 
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examinations.54  In September 2005, Judge Blue ordered a presentment at 
which Brewer failed to appear.55  As a result, Judge Blue disbarred Brewer 
for a period of five years.56 
III.  HOW COURTS ADDRESS DEPOSITION MISCONDUCT 
Generally, courts have broad discretion to fashion sanctions for 
deposition misconduct.57  But where does this power come from?  
Congress gave federal courts power to regulate attorney conduct in 28 
U.S.C. § 1927, which states: 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in 
any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who 
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally 
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 
incurred because of such conduct.58 
The statute provides that the sanctions can be imposed directly against the 
attorney where the judge finds the misconduct was the attorney’s idea as 
opposed to the client’s.  Such sanctions are an important tool for courts in 
deterring and punishing misbehavior at depositions, and are also a way to 
protect clients from paying for the transgressions of their attorneys.59 
Different jurisdictions have also promulgated rules designed to 
regulate deposition conduct.60  The FRCP provide that “[t]he court may 
impose an appropriate sanction—including the reasonable expenses and 
attorney’s fees incurred by any party—on a person who impedes, delays, 
or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.”61  Rule 30(d) was added 
in 1993 to give courts express power to punish excessive objecting, 
speaking objections, and improper instructions not to answer.62  Upon a 
motion, a district court can also issue orders pertaining to any step in the 
discovery process, including depositions.  If the district court where the 
action is pending gives an order regarding discovery that is disobeyed, 
courts have additional authority under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), which states: 
                                                                                                                          
54 Id. at *4. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
58 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006). 
59 Carr & Smith, supra note 3, at 644. 
60 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 282–84 & nn.40–50.  Specifically, FRCP 30 governs conduct at 
depositions.  AG Equip. Co. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., No. 07-CV-556-CVE-PJC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
99915, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 2008). 
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2). 
62 Dickerson, supra note 1, at 280–81; David F. Herr & Nicole Narotzky, Sanctions in Civil 
Litigation: A Review of Sanctions by Rule, Statute, and Inherent Power, Course No. SN009 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 1741, 1810–11 (2007). 
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If a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent . . . 
fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the 
court where the action is pending may issue further just 
orders.  They may include the following: 
(i)  directing that the matters embraced in the order or 
other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of 
the action, as the prevailing party claims; 
(ii)  prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or 
opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
(iii)  striking pleadings in whole or in part; 
(iv)  staying further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed; 
(v)  dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in 
part; 
(vi)  rendering a default judgment against the disobedient 
party; or 
(vii)  treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any 
order except an order to submit to a physical or mental 
examination.63 
Instead of or in addition to any of the above orders, district courts may also 
order expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) to be paid by the 
misbehaving party, the misbehaving party’s attorney, or both, “unless the 
failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”64  While some of the 
available relief is to be used only in extreme circumstances, these rules 
give the courts considerable power to craft an appropriate sanction for an 
abusive party.65 
A court dealing with deposition misconduct has many options 
available.  These can be grouped into two broader categories: monetary 
sanctions and non-monetary sanctions.  This section examines how the 
courts resolved many of the instances of deposition misconduct discussed 
in Part II. 
                                                                                                                          
63 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). 
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C)(1). 
65 See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (stating that 
“the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the 
district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to 
warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct”); Schreiber v. Moe, 
No. 06-2414, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22927, at *13 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2008) (noting that dismissal is a 
“harsh sanction which the court should order only in extreme situations”). 
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A.  Monetary Sanctions 
Courts will often order monetary sanctions when faced with conduct 
that frustrates the deposition process.  Such sanctions can include 
reimbursement for costs of bringing the misconduct to the attention of the 
court, including associated reasonable attorneys’ fees, or any other reason 
that the court deems appropriate.66  In GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., the 
court sanctioned the deponent, Aaron Wider, for “1) engaging in hostile, 
uncivil, and vulgar conduct; 2) impeding, delaying, and frustrating fair 
examination; and 3) failing to answer and providing intentionally evasive 
answers to deposition questions.”67  The court based its decision on FRCP 
37(a)(3)(B)(i) and 30(d)(2).68  The court also found that Wider’s attorney, 
Joseph Ziccardi, “persistently failed to intercede and correct Wider’s 
violations of the Federal Rules.”69  The court sanctioned Attorney Ziccardi, 
stating that “any reasonable attorney representing Wider would have 
intervened in an effort to curb Wider’s misconduct.”70  Wider and Ziccardi 
were jointly and severally sanctioned over $16,000 for GMAC’s costs and 
attorneys’ fees for the deposition, and were ordered to pay over $13,000 
for costs associated with bringing the motion to the court.71  The court 
denied Ziccardi’s motion for reconsideration.72 
The trial court in Simmons v. Minerley found that the attorney’s 
extensive witness coaching “not only failed to comport with the spirit of 
the [New York] Civil Practice Law and Rules,” but also violated specific 
provisions of the rules.73  Specifically, the judge found that the attorney 
“repeatedly directed his client not to answer; repeatedly interrupted the 
deposition; and repeatedly provided instructions in his statements as to 
how the witness should respond.”74  The judge ordered the attorney to pay 
$2500 to defense counsel for the costs incurred as a result of his conduct at 
the deposition, and ordered the plaintiff to reappear for a further 
deposition.75 
Courts can also get creative with monetary sanctions, as is evidenced 
by the court’s decision in R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. U.S. Fire 
Insurance Co.76  The judge found both attorneys at fault for frustrating the 
goal of discovery.  Because both parties had engaged in the offensive 
                                                                                                                          
66 See Carr & Smith, supra note 3, at 644. 
67 GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 186, 193 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
68 Id. at 193.  FRCP 37(a)(3)(B)(i) permits a party to move to compel disclosure when a deponent 
fails to answer a question asked.  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i).  
69 GMAC Bank, 248 F.R.D. at 194–95. 
70 Id. at 197. 
71 Id. at 193, 198. 
72 GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 252 F.R.D. 253, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
73 Simmons v. Minerley, No. 5554/06, 2007 WL 2409595, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 24, 2007). 
74 Id. at *6. 
75 Id. at *7. 
76 102 F.R.D. 39, 41 (D. Md. 1983). 
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behavior, the court did not order immediate sanctions.  Instead, the judge 
ordered that at future depositions, each interruption by either counsel 
would result in a $5 penalty, and  
any counsel who engages in any argument with other 
counsel, makes any ad hominem comments regarding other 
counsel or witnesses, or makes other extraneous remarks 
shall personally pay to all other counsel attending the 
deposition the sum of [five dollars] each, as liquidated 
attorney’s fees and expenses, for each line or part thereof in 
the transcript, of such argument, comments, or remarks.77 
Clearly, courts have great leeway in drawing up the monetary sanctions 
that they deem appropriate.78 
B.  Non-Monetary Sanctions 
Courts also choose to order a wide range of non-monetary sanctions, as 
several of the judges did in the cases discussed in Part II.  In Saldana v. 
Kmart Corp., the district court noted that “[t]o Attorney Rohn, litigation is 
a form of mortal combat which she must win at any and all costs, rather 
than the structured and professional mechanism civilized society has 
established for peaceably resolving legitimate disputes.”79  The court 
ordered Attorney Rohn to attend and complete a continuing legal education 
seminar on civility, to write letters of apology to the lawyers, witnesses, 
and court reporters she offended, and to pay her opponent’s costs and 
attorney’s fees for pursuing the motion for sanctions.80 
Surprisingly, the Third Circuit reversed, stating that because the 
“language complained of in this case did not occur in the presence of the 
Court and there is no evidence that it affected either the affairs of the Court 
or the ‘orderly and expeditious disposition’ of any cases before it,” the 
district court had abused its discretion in ordering sanctions.81  One scholar 
has described the district court’s approach as an ethical one, since it was 
focused on the mere fact that the remarks were made, while characterizing 
the Third Circuit’s reasoning as a procedural approach because the 
appellate judges were only concerning themselves with the overall impact 
on the litigation.82 
                                                                                                                          
77 Id.  
78 See, e.g., Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 190–91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (ordering 
an attorney to pay $500 to the Clients’ Security Fund and $500 to opposing counsel for discriminatory 
language). 
79 Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 629, 639 (V.I. 1999), rev’d in part, 260 F.3d. 228 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
80 Id. at 641. 
81 Saldana, 260 F.3d at 238.  
82 See Piazzola, supra note 3, at 1237. 
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In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., the 
Delaware Supreme Court observed that “[t]he issue of discovery abuse, 
including lack of civility and professional misconduct during depositions, 
is a matter of considerable concern to Delaware courts and courts around 
the nation.”83  The court noted that “[i]f a Delaware lawyer had engaged in 
the kind of misconduct committed by Mr. Jamail on this record, that 
lawyer would have been subject to censure or more serious sanctions.”84  
Finding that there was no mechanism in place to sanction an out-of-state 
lawyer not acting on a pro hac vice basis, the court ruled that Attorney 
Jamail would be given thirty days to file a voluntary appearance to argue 
why his obstructionist conduct “should not be considered as a bar to any 
future appearance [by him] in a Delaware proceeding.”85  Mr. Jamail did 
not appear in Delaware court to contest.86 
In Laddcap Value Partners, LP v. Lowenstein Sandler P.C., the court 
found the attorney’s discriminatory remarks “inherently and palpably 
adverse to the goals of justice and the legal profession,” as well as a 
violation of the recently amended Code of Professional Responsibility.87  
The judge noted the court’s “broad discretion” to oversee discovery 
including the ordering of a special referee to handle future issues and the 
issuance of sanctions.88  The judge ordered a special referee to oversee 
future depositions in the case, which would be held at the courthouse.89  
Requiring that depositions be supervised and held at the courthouse can be 
an effective solution to deposition misconduct, but it can also further clog 
an already overburdened judiciary if the referee is another judge. 
In Hall v. Clifton Precision, in light of the many conferences and 
objections during the depositions in question, Judge Gawthrop conducted 
an extensive review of the importance of focused and succinct depositions.  
He stated: 
[I]n short, depositions are to be limited to what they were and 
are intended to be: question-and-answer sessions between a 
lawyer and a witness aimed at uncovering the facts in a 
lawsuit.  When a deposition becomes something other than 
that because of the strategic interruptions, suggestions, 
statements, and arguments of counsel, it not only becomes 
                                                                                                                          
83 Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 52 (Del. 1994). 
84 Id. at 55. 
85 Id. at 56. 
86 Nelson, supra note 3, at 1477 (citing Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical 
Cancer in Civil Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 567 n.13 (1996)). 
87 Laddcap Value Partners, LP v. Lowenstein Sandler P.C., No. 600973-2007, 2007 WL 4901555, 
at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 2007) (quoting Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1992)). 
88 Id. at *3. 
89 Id. at *8. 
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unnecessarily long, but it ceases to serve the purpose of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: to find and fix the truth.90 
Instead of issuing sanctions immediately, Judge Gawthrop chose to set 
forth nine orders for subsequent deposition, including: 
3.  Counsel shall not direct or request that a witness not 
answer a question, unless that counsel has objected to the 
question on the ground that the answer is protected by a 
privilege or a limitation on evidence directed by the court. 
4.  Counsel shall not make objections or statements 
which might suggest an answer to a witness.  Counsels’ [sic] 
statements when making objections should be succinct and 
verbally economical, stating the basis of the objection and 
nothing more. 
5.  Counsel and their witness-clients shall not engage in 
private, off-the-record conferences during depositions or 
during breaks or recesses, except for the purpose of deciding 
whether to assert a privilege. 
6.  Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in 
violation of, guideline (5) are a proper subject for inquiry by 
deposing counsel to ascertain whether there has been any 
witness-coaching and, if so, what.91 
                                                                                                                          
90 Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (footnote omitted). 
91 Id. at 531–32.  The remaining orders were as follows: 
1.  At the beginning of the deposition, deposing counsel shall instruct the witness 
to ask deposing counsel, rather than the witness’s own counsel, for clarifications, 
definitions, or explanations of any words, questions, or documents presented during 
the course of the deposition.  The witness shall abide by these instructions. 
2.  All objections, except those which would be waived if not made at the 
deposition under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 32(d)(3)(B), and those necessary 
to assert a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to 
present a motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30(d), shall be 
preserved.  Therefore, those objections need not and shall not be made during the 
course of depositions. 
. . .  
7.  Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in violation of, guideline (5) 
shall be noted on the record by the counsel who participated in the conference.  The 
purpose and outcome of the conference shall also be noted on the record. 
8.  Deposing counsel shall provide to the witness’s counsel a copy of all 
documents shown to the witness during the deposition.  The copies shall be provided 
either before the deposition begins or contemporaneously with the showing of each 
document to the witness.  The witness and the witness’s counsel do not have the 
right to discuss documents privately before the witness answers questions about 
them. 
9.  Depositions shall otherwise be conducted in compliance with the Opinion 
which accompanies this Order. 
Id. 
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At least one author has noted the importance of Judge Gawthrop’s decision 
in Hall, calling it a “significant contribution to the case law on deposition 
conduct.”92  In Heller v. Consolidated Rail Corp., a later deposition 
conduct case, Judge Gawthrop emphasized that deponent’s counsel did not 
have to remain “utterly mute,” explaining that counsel must periodically 
“interrupt to protect [their] client from overreaching and abuse by an 
opponent, provided it is done within the rules.”93 
Most cases involving deposition misconduct are situations where 
counsel for one party behaves badly to gain a perceived advantage over a 
more civilized adversary.  Sometimes, however, the misconduct goes both 
ways.  In AG Equipment Co. v. AIG Life Insurance Co., the court found 
that “[b]oth lawyers made inappropriate speaking objections to deposition 
questions and improperly instructed witnesses not to answer questions” at 
several depositions.94  The court stated: 
Both sides have complained about opposing counsel’s 
conduct during depositions and have submitted reams of 
deposition transcript pages to support their outrage.  The 
Court’s extensive review of these pages serves as a useful 
reminder that loaded guns, sharp objects and law degrees 
should be kept out of the reach of children.95 
The court ultimately sanctioned both of the attorneys $250, to be paid to 
the Tulsa County Bar Association for the purpose of funding a continuing 
legal education course on proper deposition conduct and etiquette.96 
Courts can also take more drastic steps, such as suspending an 
attorney, as was the case in Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Co.97  Dr. Castillo’s deposition began with plaintiff’s counsel objecting to 
producing a number of documents asserting privilege and claiming they 
were duplicative and irrelevant.98  As the court noted, the deposition “did 
not get very far . . . even though it took all day and 281 pages of 
transcript,” due to the many objections of plaintiff’s counsel and the 
doctor’s non-responsive answers and stonewalling.99  Judge Baker did not 
find merit in the objections and stated that the conduct of plaintiff and his 
attorney was “the most outrageous example of evasion and obfuscation that 
I have seen in years,” and “a deliberate frustration of defendants’ attempt 
                                                                                                                          
92 Dickerson, supra note 1, at 292. 
93 Heller v. Consol. Rail Corp., Civ. No. 95-3935, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11615, at *9 n.2 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 7, 1995). 
94 AG Equip. Co. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., No. 07-CV-556-CVE-PJC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99915, 
at *7–8 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 2008) (footnotes omitted). 
95 Id. at *7. 
96 Id. at *9. 
97 938 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1991). 
98 Id. at 778. 
99 Id. 
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to secure discovery.”100  Judge Baker issued sanctions of over $6300 to be 
paid by the plaintiff and his counsel, and ordered that the doctor answer the 
questions that had not been answered at the deposition “without 
interference from the doctor’s counsel.”101 
At the second deposition, plaintiff’s counsel “willfully and 
contumaciously disobeyed the court’s order by interfering with the 
questions” and “directing the doctor not to respond to certain questions.”102  
When defense counsel suggested that they call Judge Baker from the office 
phone—there were no cell phones yet—to resolve the impasse, plaintiff’s 
Attorney Walker responded: 
MR. WALKER:  I would caution you not to use any 
telephones in this office unless you are invited to do so, 
counsel. 
MR. STANKO:  You’re telling me I can’t use your 
telephones? 
MR. WALKER:  You can write your threatening letters to 
me.  But, you step outside this room and touch the telephone, 
and I’ll take care of that in the way one does who has 
possessory rights.103 
Judge Baker found Attorney Walker in contempt, dismissed the case with 
prejudice, and referred the matter to a panel of judges to determine what 
other discipline would be just.104  The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that 
Judge Baker would only have abused his discretion by not imposing 
sanctions.105 
The disciplinary panel stated that “Mr. Walker’s knowing, deliberate, 
and willful disobedience of Judge Baker’s order is discovery abuse of a 
genre never before seen by this Court.  Mr. Walker’s conduct is also the 
most egregious example of lawyer incivility that this Court has ever 
seen.”106  Noting its inherent power and responsibility to regulate conduct 
of attorneys admitted to practice, the court ordered Mr. Walker to be 
suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and not to be 
readmitted until further order of the court.107  As this was a case of first 
impression, the court also specifically noted their hope that this case would 
act as a deterrent, stating that this case established a new standard for 
lawyers in the district “who engage in unprofessional conduct when 
                                                                                                                          
100 Id. at 777. 
101 Id. at 779. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 779–80. 
105 Id. at 780–81. 
106 Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 828 F.Supp. 594, 600 (C.D. Ill. 1992). 
107 Id. at 604. 
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attending or taking depositions.”108  Courts, vested with such broad 
authority, can get quite inventive in determining how to punish misconduct 
at depositions.109 
IV.  THE CONNECTICUT EXPERIENCE 
Connecticut courts have sanctioning power similar to that provided by 
the FRCP.  As a preliminary matter, trial courts have the inherent authority 
to regulate the conduct of attorneys.110  When it comes to problems with 
discovery, Connecticut courts have “broad discretion” to impose sanctions 
for failure to comply with discovery rules.111  Practice Book section 13-
14(a) provides that in the case of failing to appear or testify at a deposition, 
“the judicial authority may, on motion, make such order as the ends of 
justice require.”112  In addition, it has been long held that courts in 
Connecticut have the inherent power to issue sanctions to enforce the rules 
of court.113 
In Ranfone v. Ranfone—a case brought to modify alimony payments—
the plaintiff sought sanctions for conduct at a deposition, claiming that 
defense counsel improperly instructed his witness not to answer questions, 
coached his witness through objections, and terminated the deposition 
before it was over.114  The court found that the defense attorney had 
violated Practice Book section 13-30(b) and ordered sanctions in the 
amount of $1000 to be paid by the defense attorney, not his client.115  The 
court declined to refer defense counsel to the Statewide Grievance 
                                                                                                                          
108 Id. at 603. 
109 It is important to note that an attorney can feel the effects of a sanction—whether monetary or 
non-monetary—beyond the jurisdiction where the sanction was issued.  Many jurisdictions 
make the granting of pro hac vice status contingent on the applicant setting forth in an affidavit all 
prior reprimands and disciplinary action taken against them, including an explanation of the relevant 
circumstances.  See, e.g., CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 2-16, in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra 
note 35, at 103 (requiring an attorney applying for pro hac vice status to certify in an affidavit “whether 
such applicant has . . . ever been  reprimanded, suspended, placed on inactive status, disbarred, or 
otherwise disciplined . . . and, if so, [to] set[] forth the circumstances concerning such action”). 
110 See Burton v. Mottolese, 835 A.2d 998, 1017 (Conn. 2003) (noting the court’s inherent 
authority to regulate conduct of members of the bar); Bergeron v. Mackler, 623 A.2d 489, 493 (Conn. 
1993) (citing State v. Jones, 429 A.2d 936, 939 (Conn. 1980), overruled in part by State v. Powell, 442 
A.2d 939, 944 (Conn. 1982)) (same). 
111 Faile v. Zarich, No. HHDX04CV5015994S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1779, at *22–23 
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2008) (quoting Ne. Sav., F.A. v. Plymouth Commons Realty Corp., 642 
A.2d 1194, 1196 (Conn. 1994)). 
112  CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 13-14(a), in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 35, at 194. 
113 See Millbrook Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 776 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Conn. 2001) 
(stating that “a court may, either under its inherent power to impose sanctions in order to compel 
observance of its rules and orders, or under the provisions of § 13-14, impose sanctions”); Stanley v. 
City of Hartford, 103 A.2d 147, 149 (Conn. 1954) (noting that “the court has inherent power to provide 
for the imposition of reasonable sanctions to compel the observance of its rules”). 
114 Ranfone v. Ranfone, No. FA040490123S, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1045, at *1–2 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2007). 
115 Id. at *6, 8. 
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Committee.116  Upon reconsideration, however, the court vacated the order 
of sanctions, stating that “neither side is beyond reproach.”117 
In a recent Connecticut Superior Court decision, a defense attorney 
was sanctioned for witness coaching and deliberate obstructive conduct.118  
Judge Shapiro explained in detail what kinds of objections are permitted in 
a deposition.  The judge noted that in Connecticut, “[e]vidence objected to 
shall be taken subject to the objections.  Any objection during a deposition 
must be stated concisely and in a non-argumentative manner.”119  The 
judge further observed that “[c]ounsel at deposition[s] cannot act 
unprofessionally or interrupt or use speaking objections or testify for a 
witness.”120  Judge Shapiro examined transcripts from three depositions 
taken in the case, and listed several examples of witness coaching by 
defense counsel including: 
Q.  [Plaintiffs’ counsel]:  If you had been involved in Mr. 
Faile’s [the decedent] care on March 22, would you expect 
there to be an entry in the chart? 
[Defense Counsel]:  Objection to the form of the question. 
Just to remind you, we don’t know if this is the whole chart.  
. . .  
Q.  [Plaintiffs’ counsel]:  Would there have been also an 
attending cardiologist likewise on call? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  [Plaintiffs’ counsel]:  Was that Dr. Zarich that day? 
A.  Yes. 
[Defense Counsel]:  Do you know that?  Be careful of that 
because I don’t think he was on call that day, but I could be 
wrong.  
. . .  
Q.  [Plaintiffs’ counsel]:  Did you tell him whether he would 
be admitted overnight following the procedure? 
A.  I’m not sure exactly what I told him at the time. 
                                                                                                                          
116 See id. at *8–9 (finding that the sanctions imposed “fit the conduct”). 
117 Ranfone v. Ranfone, No. FA040490123S, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3344, at *7 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2007). 
118 Faile v. Zarich, No. CV 5015994S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1779, at *1, 30 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. July 10, 2008). 
119 Id. at *4 (quoting CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 13-30(b) (2008)) (alteration in original). 
120 Id. (quoting Fletcher v. PGT Trucking, Inc., No. CV 9600547653S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2794, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1998)). 
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Q.  [Plaintiffs’ counsel]:  What was your practice back then, 
when you had patients come in for catheterization as to how 
long they would be in the hospital? 
[Defense Counsel]:  Objection to the form.  And Mr. Faile 
didn’t come in for a catheterization.121 
The court found these—along with numerous other examples—to be 
improper witness coaching by reminding the witness of prior testimony, 
suggesting answers, and commenting on the evidence, all in violation of 
Connecticut Practice Book section 13-30(b).122 
As the court noted, in Connecticut, sanctions for violating a discovery 
rule can be imposed if three conditions are met:  “First, the order  to be 
complied with must be reasonably clear . . . Second, the record must 
establish that the order was in fact violated . . . Third, the sanction imposed 
must be proportional to the violation.”123  Ultimately, Judge Shapiro denied 
the motion to preclude defense counsel from defending future depositions, 
but did impose monetary sanctions against the lawyer equal to one-half of 
the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees in connection with the deposition, and 
ordered defense counsel not to “suggest answers, [or] make comments 
about the facts of the case” at future depositions.124 
After this sanction order, two subsequent depositions were taken, but 
defense counsel continued to engage in obstructive tactics, thereby causing 
plaintiffs’ counsel to file further motions for sanctions, to compel, and for 
protective order.125  Specifically, Judge Shapiro found that defense counsel 
refused to allow the deponent to answer questions without procuring a 
protective order in violation of the Connecticut Practice Book and his 
previous sanction order.126  Defense counsel also told plaintiffs’ counsel 
several times to “ask his next question rather than allowing the witness to 
answer,” ignoring the court’s previous orders.127 
The court found that re-depositions—and in the case of one witness, a 
third deposition—were appropriate, and determined that further sanctions 
were warranted.128  Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that in addition to violating 
the court’s previous sanction orders, defense counsel violated Connecticut 
Rules of Professional Conduct 3.4(1), 3.4(3), 3.4(4), 3.4(6), and 8.4(4).129  
                                                                                                                          
121 Id. at *10–11, *16–17 (alterations in original) (emphasis added). 
122 Id. at *22. 
123 Id. at *2 (quoting Wexler v. DeMaio, 905 A.2d 1196, 1203–04 (Conn. 2006)) (omissions in 
original). 
124 Id. at *30. 
125 Faile v. Zarich, No. HHDX04CV065015994S, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1600, at *1–2 
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 15, 2009). 
126 Id. at *7–8. 
127 Id. at *8. 
128 Id. at *8–11. 
129 Id. at *11. 
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The court noted that in Connecticut, a violation of a Rule of Professional 
Conduct may be found “where the attorney intended to engage in the 
conduct for which the attorney is sanctioned,” and that no scienter is 
required.130  After considering each of the rules, the court found violations 
of Rules 3.4(1), 3.4(3), and 8.4(4).131 
As for the proper penalty, the court noted that disqualification is a 
harsh remedy and that plaintiffs’ counsel did not meet its heavy burden of 
showing that disqualification was appropriate.132  Instead, Judge Shapiro 
noted that defense counsel had been sanctioned by various judges five 
previous times—including his prior order in the Faile case—and that 
because there were still future depositions to be conducted, further 
sanctions were necessary.133  Judge Shapiro examined the plaintiffs’ 
claimed attorneys’ fees and determined that $7,922.87 were applicable to 
the depositions and subsequent motions for sanctions.134  The court, 
however, increased the amount by fifty percent “in order to attempt to 
deter improper conduct in the future,” ordering that defense counsel—and 
not the defendant—pay a total of $11,884.31 to plaintiffs’ counsel within 
forty-five days.135  The court also put defense counsel on notice that “if 
conduct . . . at future depositions is found to warrant additional 
sanctions . . . the court w[ould] consider disqualification as an additional 
sanction.”136  Defense counsel filed a motion to reargue and/or for 
reconsideration, which Judge Shapiro denied.137 
Until January 1, 2009, Practice Book section 13-30(b) stated in 
pertinent part: “[A]ny objection during a deposition must be stated 
concisely and in a nonargumentative manner.”138  Section 13-30(b) has 
now been modified.  The old provision requiring concise and 
nonargumentative objections has been removed and replaced with: “Every 
                                                                                                                          
130 Id. at *12.  
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3.4 provides that “[a] lawyer shall not: (1) [u]nlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence . . . ; 
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A.2d 516, 540–41 (Conn. 2002). 
133 Faile, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1600, at *25–26. 
134 Id. at *37. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Faile v. Zarich, No. HHDX04CV065015994S, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2406, at *1, 39 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2009).   
138 CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 13-30(b), in OFFICIAL 2008 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK 
83, 192 (2008). 
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objection raised during a deposition shall be stated succinctly and framed 
so as not to suggest an answer to the deponent and, at the request of the 
questioning attorney, shall include a clear statement as to any defect in 
form or other basis of error or irregularity.”139  This language could have 
been added in response to the Faile decision, in order to clamp down on 
witness coaching through objections, or the decision in Lowell v. 
Schustock, to require a clear statement of the grounds for any form 
objection.  The commentary to these revisions states that the changes to 
section 13-30(b) were intended to “clarif[y] the procedure to be followed 
in making objections during depositions.”140  It will be interesting to see 
what impact this new rule has on objection procedure. 
In 1983, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and, since then, forty-nine states, 
the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands have adopted them.141  
Connecticut adopted the Model Rules—almost verbatim—in 1986,142 and 
its attorneys must observe them in practice.143  Several of Connecticut’s 
Rules of Professional Conduct could be used by courts when dealing with 
attorneys who have misused the deposition process.144  For example, Rule 
3.2 requires attorneys to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation 
consistent with the interests of [their] client.”145  Attorneys who prolong or 
frustrate depositions could be in violation of this rule.  Rule 8.4 describes 
six categories of professional misconduct including: “[e]ngag[ing] in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”146  Those 
employing “Rambo” tactics during depositions could obviously run afoul 
of this provision.  These rules can be enforced through grievances filed by 
clients, other attorneys,147 or even by judges,148 each of which go to the 
Statewide Grievance Committee. 
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148 See Burton v. Mottolese, 835 A.2d 998, 1009–12 (Conn. 2003) (upholding the trial judge’s 
finding that the plaintiff had violated several of Connecticut’s Rules of Professional Conduct). 
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In Connecticut, discipline can also be imposed by the court without a 
referral to a grievance panel.  In Burton v. Mottolese, the plaintiff—an 
attorney who had been disbarred by the judge with no prior disciplinary 
referral—claimed that the court did not have the authority to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings, arguing that the process required written 
grievances submitted to the Statewide Grievance Committee.149  The 
Connecticut Supreme Court determined that trial courts have the inherent 
authority to discipline and regulate conduct of the members of the state 
bar.150  
It is clear that there are a number of methods for regulating attorney 
conduct in Connecticut through the courts—through motions, using 
inherent power, or using relevant Practice Book sections—or through the 
Statewide Grievance Committee, but must courts intervene if they are 
made aware of misconduct, or can they let the misbehavior slide in favor of 
clearing their dockets?  An answer to this question came in the recent 
decision in Ramin v. Ramin.151 
In Ramin, the Connecticut Supreme Court was faced with a situation 
where a superior court judge refused to hear a plaintiff’s fifth motion for 
contempt—for failing to produce a number of documents.152  Because the 
trial court did not act to enforce its prior discovery orders—the subject of 
the first four motions for contempt—subsequent depositions were spent 
trying to uncover what the court had already ordered to be revealed, 
leading to “defiant, disrespectful and uncooperative” conduct by the 
defendant.153  The defendant at one point threw his wallet at plaintiff’s 
counsel, used obscenities frequently, and, during one part of the 
questioning, decided to read a magazine.154  The Connecticut Supreme 
Court stated that the “defendant’s behavior during his deposition 
exemplifies why a trial court should not refuse to sanction a noncompliant 
party for failure to obey court orders.”155  The court reversed the trial court 
and remanded, noting that the trial court on remand could consider 
awarding attorneys’ fees against the party whose litigation misconduct 
caused the fees to be incurred.156 
Ramin was important enough that the Connecticut Supreme Court 
issued its decision after rehearing the case en banc.157  There are no 
statistics, but it would not be surprising to find that judges often let certain 
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discovery tactics slide rather than make the client suffer for the lawyer’s 
misbehavior.  This is a consideration for any judge dealing with abuses of 
the litigation process, but the Ramin court was clearly telling trial judges 
that they can no longer ignore discovery problems that come to their 
attention.  The question now becomes, how should trial courts handle 
discovery and, specifically, deposition misconduct? 
V.  SUGGESTIONS FOR HANDLING DEPOSITION MISCONDUCT 
“Misconduct at depositions is not the province of one side or the 
other . . . .”158 As discussed above, attorneys on both sides of a 
deposition—and even deponents themselves—can be guilty of abusing the 
deposition process.  There have also been a number of sanctions that courts 
have crafted to penalize offending attorneys and parties, but these 
interventions only occur when the misconduct has reached a point where it 
requires a judge’s attention.  What steps can be taken to reduce the number 
of times judges have to impose sanctions by deterring “Rambo” tactics 
inside the deposition room in the first place? 
At least one scholar has advocated for a broad “judge on call” system 
to allow attorneys who encounter trouble immediate access to judicial 
protection.159  Professor Cary argued that this “judge on call” system 
should resemble the medical profession’s emergency care system, with 
phone calls transcribed by court reporters, the judicial authority to “make 
immediate rulings on behavior at the deposition,” and the authority to order 
costs paid by an attorney who loses on a motion and to impose other 
sanctions as the court sees fit.160  Cary admits that a judge hotline would be 
expensive and time-consuming, but argues that the benefits would quickly 
outweigh the costs as attorneys would modify their behavior knowing that 
sanctions could come as swiftly as a phone call.161  Also weighing against 
an on-call system is the likelihood that the judge who picks up the phone 
would not be familiar with the case’s history or past dealings between the 
attorneys during the instant case.  Some districts do allow for judges to be 
on call to resolve discovery disputes when they arise.162  Other judges have 
ordered that future discovery be overseen by a magistrate or judge.163  
Many courts have backlogged dockets, and it is likely that a “judge on 
call” system would take up a great deal of judges’ time, so this approach 
may have limited usefulness. 
                                                                                                                          
158 Carr & Smith, supra note 3, at 635. 
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161 Id. at 593–94. 
162 Carr & Smith, supra note 3, at 648. 
163 See, e.g., Laddcap Value Partners, LP v. Lowenstein Sandler P.C., No. 52538, slip op. at 8 
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Professor Cary also recommends that lawyers take it upon themselves 
to report “Rambo” behavior to disciplinary committees with more 
frequency.164  Cary notes that, often, attorneys do not want to complain, or 
be seen as tattletales or weaklings who cannot handle such problems on 
their own, or some lawyers decide that the behavior they encountered—
while bad—was not that bad.165  She notes, “Judges should not have to 
seek out examples of Rambo litigation in the deposition transcripts filed 
with the court.”166 
Professor Cary further advocates for law schools to take a proactive 
approach in curbing “Rambo” lawyering, as well as teaching students how 
to deal with situations where they have to deal with obstructionist 
tactics.167  By exploring litigation misconduct and discussing sanctions, 
Cary believes that law schools can help students come up with remedies 
for this unfortunate byproduct of discovery.168  This could easily be done in 
required courses on ethics and professionalism.  Questions on these issues 
could also be added to the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination, which would further require future lawyers to learn about 
deposition misconduct and the hazards of engaging in it. 
When judges do become aware of deposition misconduct, they should 
take quick steps to intervene and use their authority—whether statutory or 
inherent—to halt the abuse.  Many jurisdictions have enacted local rules—
such as those contained in Connecticut’s Practice Book and New York’s 
Civil Practice Law and Rules—which give judges the power to sanction 
attorneys.  In Connecticut, for example, judges should use the broad power 
given to them under Practice Book section 13-14 to make “such order[s] as 
the ends of justice require.”169  Attorneys must know that the court will 
take action against them if they abuse or obstruct depositions.  What good 
is a grant of power if attorneys do not think the court will actually use it? 
One way to deter deposition misconduct is for a lawyer to demand that 
potentially troublesome depositions be videotaped.  This could easily be 
ordered in response to a motion for protective order.  If a deposition is 
videotaped, attorneys know that their conduct will be more easily 
evaluated by the judge should opposing counsel need to bring it to the 
court’s attention.  It is easier to tell what happened at a deposition if it has 
been videotaped than it would be if a judge has to read the deposition 
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transcript.  The FRCP allow for videotaped depositions.170  Likewise, the 
Connecticut Practice Book permits videotaped depositions if any party 
provides written notice.171  Connecticut judges are also permitted to order a 
deposition to be videotaped upon motion.172 
The usefulness of videotaped depositions is demonstrated by GMAC 
Bank v. HTFC Corp.173  The two-day deposition of Mr. Wider was 
videotaped and submitted to the court for use during the hearing on 
sanctions.  Judge Robreno conducted an extensive review of the transcript 
and recordings, noting that “few depositions warrant sanctions more than 
this one.”174  In addition to the abundant profanity used by Mr. Wider, the 
video recording allowed the court to uncover “further indicia of Wider’s 
intent to exploit and protract his deposition,” including “gleeful smirk[s]” 
at his attorney, the court reporter, and even the camera itself.175  Wider also 
patted himself on the back “after a particularly odious instance of 
obstruction.”176  Wider’s counsel argued that his conduct was justified 
because opposing counsel provoked him.177  With the clear evidence from 
the video recording, Judge Robreno rejected this argument because counsel 
for GMAC was clearly courteous and respectful even in the face of 
relentless insults and mockery.178  The video also allowed the court to see 
the true extent of Attorney Ziccardi’s failure to intervene.179 
Of course it is possible to abuse video depositions, as was the case in 
Kelly v. GAF Corp.180  In Kelly, one of the witnesses was unavailable for 
trial so his testimony was taken by video deposition.181  As the judge 
pointed out, it is important with video depositions “to keep objections and 
bickering to a minimum.”182  Instead, defense counsel made numerous 
“inconsequential objections,” each of which required resolution by the 
court.183  If the question and answer were ruled to be excluded, the audio 
was muted from the video, creating a silence for the jury.184  Since there 
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were so many objections, the judge said the finished product was “a 
hodgepodge, completely lacking in direction and continuity.”185  Judge 
Ditter noted that the practice of constantly objecting during a video 
deposition 
provides a fertile field for mischief.  An irresponsible 
attorney can make any number of objections, ranging from 
frivolous to spurious.  The more he makes, the better things 
are in his favor.  When the time comes to present the 
deposition in court, he can withdraw the objections or permit 
them to be overruled by the court.  In any event, the result is 
a video presentation where there will be long pauses, a squeal 
or two from the television set, and the amusing spectacle of a 
witness jiggling around while the tape is speeded up until the 
next usable portion of the testimony is reached.186 
The judge ultimately ordered a new trial because the plaintiff was denied 
the opportunity to present crucial evidence.187  While it is likely that video 
recording will reduce the amount of deposition misconduct, obstructionist 
tactics can still negatively impact the evidentiary value of the session, 
especially when the deponent will not be in court to testify and the 
recording must be played for the jury. 
In the interest of avoiding further docket congestion, courts should 
refer instances of deposition misconduct to state grievance or disciplinary 
committees.  This was the route ultimately taken in Castillo v. St. Paul 
Fire.188  In Castillo, the referral panel was made up of judges, but most 
jurisdictions have established committees of lawyers and laypersons to 
deal with attorney misconduct.  Some deposition disputes would be better 
handled by a separate committee, especially when the offending actor was 
the attorney and not the client. 
In the unlikely event that a judge is not faced with a crowded docket, 
the judge may decide that he or she wants to take an active role and choose 
to hear and rule on each deposition dispute.  This was the approach taken 
by Judge Shapiro in Faile v. Zarich189 and Judge Miller in Lowell v. 
Shustock.190  There are positives and negatives to each method, and it is not 
clear which would be better at handling deposition disputes. 
Another way for courts to curb deposition misconduct would be to 
accept and endorse the American College of Trial Lawyers (“ACTL”) 
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Code of Pretrial Conduct.191  The ACTL is composed of top trial attorneys 
from the United States and Canada, with membership extended by 
invitation only.192  The ACTL has promulgated a set of pretrial standards to 
supplement—not supplant—local and procedural rules and to provide 
guidance to trial lawyers on how to handle discovery.193  According to the 
preamble, a trial lawyer in pretrial proceedings “owes opposing counsel 
duties of courtesy, candor, and cooperation in scheduling, serving papers, 
communicating in writing and in speech, conducting discovery, 
designating expert witnesses, and seeking to resolve cases without 
litigation.”194 
The standards themselves combine ethics with procedure, as opposed 
to local rules of professional conduct or the Model Rules, which tend to 
focus more on the ethical restraints on attorneys.195  Standard 5 of the 
ACTL Code of Pretrial Conduct contains several tenets that lawyers should 
observe in discovery practice.196  Standard 5(a)(1), for example, states that 
lawyers “should strictly follow all applicable rules in drafting and 
responding to written discovery and in conducting depositions.”197  Also, 
with discovery practice in general, lawyers “should conduct discovery to 
elicit relevant facts and evidence, and not for an improper purpose, such as 
to harass, intimidate, or unduly burden another party or a witness.”198  
Subsection 5(e) contains five standards to be observed when conducting 
depositions, including: 
(4)  During a deposition, lawyers should conduct themselves 
with decorum and should never verbally abuse or harass the 
witness or unnecessarily prolong the deposition.199 
(5)  During a deposition, lawyers should strictly limit 
objections to those allowed by the applicable rules.  In 
general, lawyers should object only to preserve the record, to 
assert a valid privilege, or to protect the witness from unfair, 
ambiguous, or abusive questioning.  Objections should not be 
used to obstruct questioning, to improperly communicate 
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with the witness, or to disrupt the search for facts or evidence 
germane to the case.200 
It seems that these standards were created to combat the very examples of 
deposition misconduct examined throughout this Note.  This is probably 
because the Code of Pretrial Conduct was written by distinguished trial 
lawyers for trial lawyers, in light of the many problems they have faced in 
this area.  Pretrial standards like these should be endorsed by courts around 
the country and attorneys should be held to them.  Judges could even go so 
far as to have the attorneys on cases before them agree on the record or 
sign a form, acknowledging that they will observe these standards 
throughout the case.  Instances of deposition abuse will likely be reduced if 
attorneys adhere to standards like these. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is, of course, the ever-present dilemma of punishing clients for 
the sins of their lawyers.  In 1986, the American Bar Association 
Commission on Professionalism “cautioned against imposing sanctions on 
innocent clients when they are not responsible for their lawyers’ improper 
acts, and instead suggested that in some cases the courts should report the 
misconduct to disciplinary commissions.”201  It is important that clients do 
not get punished merely because they picked a “Rambo” attorney from the 
phone book.  Many steps in discovery—e.g., interrogatories and 
depositions—can be completed with the client completely out of the loop.  
When the client is involved and the lawyer misbehaves at a deposition, 
however, as Mr. Wider did in the GMAC case, there should be 
consequences for the litigant. 
Depositions are too important a discovery device to allow misconduct 
to continue unchecked.   Attorneys should be prepared to go to the court if 
they encounter obstructionist tactics like those examined throughout this 
Note.  Judges should also become more proactive in halting deposition 
abuse whenever they encounter it, whether it be through monetary 
sanctions,202 issuing specific orders for future discovery,203 referrals to 
grievance and disciplinary committees,204 or taking further steps to 
penalize attorneys with non-monetary sanctions.205  The 1986 Commission 
on Professionalism recommended that “[t]he role of the judiciary in the 
conduct of litigation should be strengthened and courts should play a more 
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decisive role earlier in the litigation process.”206  The Commission also 
recommended that judges impose sanctions for abuse of the litigation 
process more often.207 
This Note has provided several suggestions on how to curb deposition 
abuse.  Any deposition where misbehavior is a possibility should be 
recorded by video.  Video depositions will act as a deterrent for “Rambo” 
tactics because any judge who reviews the recording will know exactly 
what happened.  Another suggestion is for judges who become aware of 
deposition misconduct to refer attorneys to local grievance committees, a 
powerful deterrent to future misbehavior.  Jurisdictions around the country 
should also endorse the standards set forth in the ACTL Code of Pretrial 
Conduct.  These standards, created by trial attorneys for trial attorneys, 
give clear guidelines for attorneys on how to properly conduct depositions 
and leave no room for abusing the process.  As Judge Gawthrop stated in 
Hall: 
The pretrial tail now wags the trial dog.  Thus, it is 
particularly important that [depositions] not be abused.  
Counsel should never forget that even though the deposition 
may be taking place far from a real courtroom, with no black-
robed overseer peering down upon them, as long as the 
deposition is conducted under the caption of this court and 
proceeding under the authority of the rules of this court, 
counsel are operating as officers of this court.  They should 
comport themselves accordingly; should they be tempted to 
stray, they should remember that this judge is but a phone 
call away.208 
Many of the problems discussed in this Note would be far less pervasive if 
more judges demonstrated Judge Gawthrop’s willingness to become 
involved. 
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